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APPLICATIONS FOR CERTIFICATES OF




Since 1925, with the passage of the Judges' Bill,' Congress
increasingly has afforded the Supreme Court unfettered
discretion to decide whichever cases it chooses.2 The Court's
"discretionary" docket includes almost all of the cases coming
before it today,3 while its "mandatory" or "obligatory" 4 docket
now includes only a select few types of cases.5
* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Houston, Texas; Lecturer, University of Houston Law
Center. J.D., Columbia Law School; B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
I. Judiciary Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (now codified as Title 28 of
the U.S. Code).
2. Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Meltzer & David Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1553-55, 1580 (5th ed., Found. Press 2003); Robert
L. Stem, Eugene Gressman, Stephen M. Shapiro & Kenneth S. Geller, Supreme Court
Practice 219-20 (8th ed. BNA 2002).
3. Fallon et al., supra n. 2, at 1595-96. The vast majority of these cases are brought
through a petition for writ of certiorari. Id.
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The Court is not required to rule on the merits of a case
within its discretionary jurisdiction. Rather, the Court, as an
exercise of its discretion, simply may refuse to hear the appeal,
even if the litigant seeking .review has raised a clearly
meritorious claim for relief.6 The overwhelming majority of
cases filed with the Court are within its discretionary docket
and, in an overwhelming majority of those cases, the Court
summarily refuses to exercise its discretion to review the
merits
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue,
it certainly appears that the Court treats an application for a
certificate of appealability (COA) under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 in a
federal habeas corpus case as falling within the Court's
discretionary jurisdiction! As discussed below, the Court's
apparent treatment of COA applications in this manner is
erroneous under the current statutory scheme. The Court, or at
least the single Circuit Justice to whom a COA application is
directed, has a legal obligation to rule on the merits of a COA
application, applying the same legal standard that governs
district and circuit judges in COA cases. That legal standard-
commonly referred to as the "Barefoot standard" '-requires a
4. Stern et al., supra n. 2, at 220 (distinguishing "discretionary" from "obligatory"
jurisdiction).
5. The only types of cases still within the Court's "obligatory" docket include appeals
of federal three-judge trial courts' rulings on congressional apportionment challenges and
certain types of civil-rights actions filed by the Attorney General. See Fallon et al., supra n.
2, at 1580.
6. Overton v. Ohio, 534 U.S. 982 (2001) (Breyer, J., respecting the denial of certiorari,
joined by Stevens, O'Connor, & Souter, JJ.).
7. Fallon et al., supra n. 2, at 1595-96.
8. According to the Supreme Court databases on WestLaw and LEXIS, in all but one
case in which an application for a COA (or its statutory predecessor, the certificate of
probable cause (CPC) to appeal) was filed with the Supreme Court during the past three
decades, the Court summarily denied the application without giving any reasons. The one
case in which a CPC was granted was Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1301 (1983) (White, J., in
chambers). There are approximately three dozen reported cases where the full Court has
summarily denied a COA or CPC application over the past thirty years. There are countless
other unreported cases in which an individual Circuit Justice summarily has denied a COA
or CPC application. See infra at 182-83, 183 n. 32. This pattern certainly suggests that the
Court treats a COA application like a certiorari petition or a petition for an original writ of
habeas corpus, which are within its discretionary jurisdiction and are summarily denied in
the vast majority of cases. See infra at 183-84.
9. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
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relatively minimal showing by a petitioner in order to authorize
an appeal following a district court's denial of habeas relief.'°
II. CERTIFICATES OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND APPEALABILITY IN
FEDERAL HABEAS CASES
Beginning in 1908, a state prisoner wishing to appeal a
federal trial court's denial of a petition for a writ of federal
habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 was required to obtain a
certificate of probable cause (CPC) authorizing an appeal."
Congress added the CPC requirement because of delays in state
capital cases caused by perceived "frivolous" appeals in federal
habeas cases.' 2 Without a CPC, no federal appellate jurisdiction
existed. '
At the time of the 1908 statute, federal circuit courts did not
possess appellate jurisdiction over a lower court's denial of a
habeas petition and, instead, an appeal of the denial of habeas
relief went directly to the Supreme Court. '4 Consistent with such
a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the 1908 CPC statute not
only authorized a federal trial judge to grant or deny an
application for a CPC but also authorized a "justice of the
Supreme Court" to do so.' In 1925, Congress expanded federal
circuit courts' appellate jurisdiction, which included authorizing
appeals in habeas cases from a district court to a circuit court.
The CPC statute was amended accordingly to provide that a
circuit judge, like a district judge, could issue a CPC; the
10. See infra at 180-81.
11. Act of March 10, 1908, ch. 76, 35 Stat. 40 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
2253).
12. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 892 n. 3 to 893; see also Ira P. Robbins, The Habeas Corpus
Certificate of Probable Cause, 44 Ohio St. L.J. 307, 313-14 (1983) (discussing history of
1908 legislation).
13. See e.g. Bilik v. Strassheim, 212 U.S. 551 (1908) (mem.) (dismissing the appeal for
want of jurisdiction based on lack of a CPC).
14. Grammer v. Fenton, 268 F. 943, 946-47 (8th Cir. 1920).
15. Robbins, supra n. 12, at 313-14; id. at 313 nn. 36, 39 (quoting former 28 U.S.C. §
466).
16. Id. at 313; Schenk v. Plummer, 113 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1940) (discussing 28 U.S.C.
§ 466 (1925), which provided that an "appeal to the circuit court of appeals shall be
allowed" from the judgment of a district court denying habeas relief if a CPC was issued);
see also U.S. ex rel. Hickey v. Jeffes, 571 F.2d 762, 765 (3rd Cir. 1978).
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amended statute logically deleted the reference to a Supreme
Court Justice's having authority to grant or deny a CPC. 7
In 1948, Congress again amended the CPC statute-
recodified in the current statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2253-and
inexplicably resurrected the 1908 statute's provision that a
Supreme Court Justice possessed the authority to rule on a CPC
application (in addition to the authority of a district or circuit
judge to do so). " The legislative history of section 2253 does not
shed any light on why Congress decided again to include
Supreme Court Justices among those having authority to grant
or deny a CPC.'9
In 1996, as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA), Congress amended section 2253 and
made sweeping changes in the federal habeas statutory scheme.2 °
Congress renamed the CPC a "certificate of appealability"
(COA), but continued to give Supreme Court Justices the
authority to grant or deny one.2' It also for the first time
extended the COA requirement to federal prisoners who file
22
post-conviction motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The COA standard set forth in the amended version of
section 2253 requires a prisoner to make "a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right" 23 before an appeal will be
authorized. In Slack v. McDaniel,24 the Supreme Court held that
this statutory language essentially codified the judicial gloss that
the Court had given the former CPC statute in Barefoot v.
Estelle.25 The Barefoot standard only requires that the legal issue
sought to be raised on appeal "be debatable among jurists of
reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different
manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve
17. Robbins, supra n. 12, at 313 n. 36; Schenk, 113 F.2d at 727, 727 n. 1.
18. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 480 (2000) (quoting Act of June 25, 1948, 62
Stat. 967).
19. See Sen. Rpt. 1559, at 9 (June 9, 1948); H.R. Rpt. 308, at app. (April 25, 1947).
20. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § !02, 110 Stat. 1217 (1996).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(I)(B).
23. Id.
24. 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000) (noting that the amended version of "§ 2253 is a
codification of the CPC standard announced in Barefoot v. Estelle").
25. 463 U.S. 880.
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encouragement to proceed further., 26 It does not require the
habeas petitioner to demonstrate a likelihood that he ultimately
will prevail on appeal.27
Recently, in Miller-El v. Cockrell,2s the Supreme Court
made clear that the Barefoot standard is not difficult for a habeas
petitioner to meet. All that is required is for at least one claim
raised by the petitioner to be reasonably "debatable" under the
AEDPA's standards. As the Court stated:
We look to the District Court's application of AEDPA to
petitioner's constitutional claims and ask whether the
resolution was debatable amongst jurists of reason. This
threshold inquiry does not require full consideration of the
factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims. In
fact, the statute forbids it. ... [A] COA does not require a
showing that the appeal will succeed.
A prisoner seeking a COA must prove "something more
than the absence of frivolity" or the existence of mere
"good faith" on his or her part. . . . We do not require
petitioner to prove, before the issuance of a COA, that
some jurists would grant the petition for habeas corpus.
Indeed, a claim can be debatable even though every jurist
of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted and
the case has received full consideration, that the petitioner
will not prevail.
The question is the debatability of the underlying
constitutional claim, not the resolution of that debate.29
26. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n. 4 (citations and internal quotations omitted; bracketed
language in original). In Slack, the Court held that a modified version of the Barefoot
standard applies when a district court denies habeas relief on a "procedural," as opposed to
a "substantive," ground. See 529 U.S. at 484 ("When the district court denies a habeas
petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional
claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling." ).
27. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 n. 4.
28. 123 S. Ct. 1029 (2003).
29. Id. at 1039-40, 1042 (citation omitted).
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III. COA APPLICATIONS FILED WITH THE SUPREME COURT OR A
CIRCUIT JUSTICE
The plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) and the
corresponding procedural rule, Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 22(b)(1), empower a single Circuit Justice to grant a
COA.30 Although both speak of a single Circuit Justice, the
Supreme Court has taken the position that section 2253 vests
jurisdiction not simply in a single Justice but in the entire Court
as well.3' In death-penalty cases, a COA application addressed to
a single Circuit Justice typically will be referred to the entire
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that "[ulnless a circuit justice or judge
issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals" in a
section 2254 habeas case) (emphasis added); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(l) ("[T]he applicant
cannot take an appeal unless a circuit justice or a circuit or district judge issues a certificate
of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).") (emphasis added).
31. E.g. In re Hunt, 348 U.S. 968 (1955) (mem.); see also Davis v. Jacobs, 454 U.S.
911, 913 (1981) (Stevens, J., addressing denial of certiorari); id. at 919 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., & Powell, J.); cf Application of Burwell, 350 U.S. 521
(1956) (per curiam) (holding that § 2253 vests jurisdiction in an entire Court of Appeals
rather than in a single circuit judge, notwithstanding the statute's reference only to a
"circuit judge") (citing Burwell v. Teets, 350 U.S. 808 (1955) (mem.), and Rogers v. Teets,
350 U.S. 809 (1955) (mem.)); Hohn v. U.S., 524 U.S. 236, 242-45 (1998) (COA
application decided by a single circuit judge actually is decided by the Court of Appeals as
opposed to being decided by the individual circuit judge "acting ex curia").
The Supreme Court possesses either "appellate" or "original" jurisdiction as set
forth in Article III of the Constitution. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243, 250-53 (1863).
The full Court obviously does not possess "original" jurisdiction over COA applications,
which do not fall within any of the limited categories set forth in Article 11. Cf Ex parte
Barry, 43 U.S. 65, 65-66 (1844) (habeas petitions not within Supreme Court's "original"
jurisdiction). It is questionable whether the full Court-as opposed to an individual Justice
in his or her capacity as a Circuit Justice-possesses "appellate" jurisdiction over a COA
application, except by way of its certiorari jurisdiction (whereby the Court reviews the
judgment of a Court of Appeals denying a COA application as opposed to ruling on the
COA application). In 28 U.S.C. § 2253, Congress intentionally mentioned only a "Circuit
Justice" and did not provide the full Court with the ability to rule on a COA application.
Under such circumstances, Congress has regulated or made exceptions to the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction by limiting the full Court's jurisdiction over COA
applications filed there. See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 97-106 (1868) (discussing
Congress's ability to "regulate" and make "exceptions" to the Supreme Court's
"appellate" jurisdiction described in Article III); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,
659-61 (1996) (same). When Congress has wished to extend the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction to an individual Circuit Justice as well as to the full Court, it has done so. See
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)) ("Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any
justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective
jurisdictions." ).
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Court for disposition as a matter of course." In non-capital
cases, a COA application addressed to a single Circuit Justice
typically will be ruled on in the first instance by the individual
Justice in an unreported order33 and, if "renewed" to another
individual Justice pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 22, typically
will be "referred" to the entire Court for disposition.34 On rare
occasions, when the full Court has summarily denied a COA
application, one or more Justices have stated in dissent that they
would grant a COA.35
Neither section 2253 nor Rule 22 states whether a Circuit
Justice (or the Court itself) has "discretionary" jurisdiction over
COA applications in the same manner in which the Court has
such discretionary jurisdiction over virtually every other matter
that comes before it.36 A COA is not an "extraordinary" writ or
any other type of extraordinary remedy or process that the Court
possesses complete discretion to grant or deny irrespective of
the merits of the application. When Congress bestows
jurisdiction in a federal court, as it has on the Supreme Court (or
at least on a single Circuit Justice) in 28 U.S.C. § 2253, it is well
established that there is a "strict duty" and "virtually unflagging
obligation.., to exercise the jurisdiction given., 37 Therefore,
the Court (or at least a single Circuit Justice) appears obligated
to apply the substantive Barefoot standard in the same manner in
which a district or circuit judge is obligated to apply that
32. See e.g. Roberts v. Luebbers, 534 U.S. 946 (2001) (mem.); McFarland v. Johnson,
523 U.S. 1103 (1998) (mem.).
33. See Stern, et al., supra n. 2, at 755.
34. See e.g. Butler v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct. 1340 (2003) (mem.); Lindow v. U.S., 526
U.S. 1108 (1999) (mem.); Smalis v. Court of Common Pleas Bail Agency, 506 U.S. 804
(1992).
35. See e.g. Anderson v. Collins, 495 U.S. 943 (1990) (summary order denying a CPC
with the notation that Brennan & Marshall, JJ., "would grant the application"). Logically,
it would seem that, when at least one Justice believes a COA should be granted, under the
Barefoot "debatability" standard, a COA should automatically issue.
36. Cf Sup. Ct. Rule 10 ("Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of
judicial discretion."); Sup. Ct. Rule 20.1 (" Issuance by the Court of an extraordinary writ
authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) is not a matter of right, but of discretion sparingly
exercised." ); see also Felker, 518 U.S. at 665 (discussing Court's discretionary jurisdiction
over petitions for original writs of habeas corpus); Parr v. U.S., 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1956)
(discussing Court's discretionary jurisdiction over applications for writs of mandamus).
37. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
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standard.3" There appears to be no principled basis for the
exercise of a certiorari-type discretion over COA applications.
Although no decision of the Court itself has addressed the
issue of whether a COAICPC application addressed to a Circuit
Justice or the full Court falls within the Court's discretionary or
obligatory dockets, decisions of individual Circuit Justices in
chambers have taken contrary positions. Justice White
apparently believed that he had an obligation to grant a CPC
when a case raised a "substantial question,"" while Chief
Justice Rehnquist commented in 1979 that it would be an
"extraordinary step" for a Circuit Justice to grant a CPC
application after the lower courts have denied a CPC.
40
Support for the proposition that a COA application falls
within a Circuit Justice's obligatory jurisdiction is found in
analogous decisions concerning bail applications submitted to
individual Circuit Justices. Numerous such decisions have noted
that Circuit Justices must engage in an "independent
determination on the merits" of a bail application, at least with
respect to questions of law as opposed to questions of fact.
4'
38. Of course, the Supreme Court possesses discretionary jurisdiction to grant certiorari
and reverse a Court of Appeals decision denying a COA. See Hohn v. U.S., 524 U.S. 236,
253 (1998) ("We hold that this Court has jurisdiction under [28 U.S.C.] § 1254(1) to
review denials of applications for certificates of appealability by a circuit judge or a panel
of a court of appeals."); see also Lozado v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430 (1991) (per curiam)
(granting certiorari, vacating order of Court of Appeals denying CPC, and remanding with
instructions to grant a CPC after concluding that the habeas petitioner had met the Barefoot
standard).
39. See Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1983) (White, J., in chambers)
(Concluding that a habeas petitioner had raised a "substantial question" that did not
"lack[] substance," Justice White stated that "I am compelled to issue a certificate of
probable cause to appeal, as I am authorized to do under § 2253.") (emphasis added).
40. See Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 442 U.S. 1301, 1303 n.* (1979) (Rehnquist, J., in
chambers).
41. See e.g. Hung v. U.S., 439 U.S. 1326, 1328 (1978) (Brennan, J., in chambers)
(noting that, although great deference must be given to decisions of district courts in
denying bail, "[a] Circuit Justice has a nondelegable responsibility to make an independent
determination on the merits of the [bail] application") (citation omitted); Mecom v. U.S.,
434 U.S. 1340, 1341 (1977) (Powell, J., in chambers) (same); Harris v. U.S., 404 U.S.
1232, 1232 (1971) (Douglas, J., in chambers) (same); Sellers v. U.S., 89 S. Ct. 36, 21 L.
Ed. 2d 64, 66 (1968) (Black, J., in chambers) (same); Leigh v. U.S., 82 S. Ct. 994, 8 L. Ed.
2d 269, 270 (1962) (Warren, C.J., in chambers) (same). Chief Justice Rehnquist has taken a
contrary position, requiring a bail applicant to show "a reasonable probability that four
Justices are likely to vote to grant certiorari" in his case. Julian v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1308,
1309 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers); see also Roth v. U.S., 77 S. Ct. 17, 1 L. Ed.2d.
34, 35 (1956) (Harlan, J., in chambers) (when lower federal courts have denied bail
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These decisions interpreted the former version of Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 46, which provided that "the trial
judge.... the court of appeals, or any judge thereof or... a
circuit justice' 42 had authority to rule on a bail application.43
Virtually identical language appears in the current version of
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1), which speak of the authority of a "Circuit Justice"
to issue a COA in addition to that of a district or circuit judge.
A related but distinct question arises if one assumes that a
single Circuit Justice (or the Court itself) must apply the
Barefoot standard pursuant to the Court's obligatory jurisdiction:
Should there be any deference 44 afforded to the decisions of the
lower court judges who denied a COA?45 The Supreme Court
has never addressed this issue directly, but in a per curiam
decision in 1967, the Court stated in passing that
[i]t is established law that a circuit judge or justice
entertaining an application for a certificate [of probable
cause to appeal] should give "weighty consideration" to its
prior denial by a district 
judge.46
Besides being dicta, the Court's description of the law as
established was unfounded. The precedent supporting this
statement cited by the Court was two Ninth Circuit decisions,
application, Circuit Justice should be "generally reluctant to interfere with the considered
view of the Court of Appeals").
42. Reynolds v. U.S., 80 S. Ct. 30, 32 (1959) (Douglas, J., in chambers) (quoting former
version of Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(a)(2)) (emphasis added).
43. The current version of the rule does not explicitly mention the authority of a Circuit
Justice to grant a bail application. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 46. It is unclear whether such
authority still exists.
44. As noted above, in bail cases, numerous in-chambers decisions by single Justices
have spoken of affording "deference" to decisions of lower court judges who denied bail.
See authorities cited in n. 41, supra. Such deference was not required by the plain language
of the former version of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a)(2).
45. No court has ever suggested that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 or Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 22, a habeas petitioner only may seek a COA from either a circuit
judge or a circuit justice (following denial of a COA by a district court), but not both
sequentially. The plain language of the statute and rule would not support such an
interpretation.
46. Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542, 543 (1967) (per curiam). This statement
was dicta because the Court was not reviewing a case where the district court had denied a
CPC. Rather, the district court had granted a COA. Id. at 542.
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each denying a CPC. 47 The first, Matter of Woods, was premised
on a misunderstanding of Supreme Court precedent which led
the Ninth Circuit to conclude that its appellate review of a
federal district court's decision denying habeas relief-as well
as its review of a CPC denial-was for abuse of discretion. 4 The
second Ninth Circuit decision, Sullivan, was simply a one-judge
order issued subsequently in another case by one of the members
of the three-judge panel in Woods.49
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court (or a single Circuit Justice acting on
behalf of the Court) cannot simply choose to exercise discretion
and summarily deny a COA application without first
meaningfully engaging in the legal analysis required by section
2253 and Barefoot. If, in the opinion of a single Circuit Justice
or the Court itself, a COA application has satisfied the Barefoot
standard, then "a COA should issue (and an appeal of the
district court's order may be taken)., 50 A COA applicant who
47. See U.S. ex rel. Sullivan v. Heinze, 250 F.2d 427, 428-29 (9th Cir. 1957) (Barnes,
J., Circuit Judge) ("While I am not bound by the decision of the court below [denying a
COA], I am duty bound to give it weighty consideration."); Matter of Woods, 249 F.2d
614, 615 (9th Cir. 1957) (per curiam decision of a three-judge panel, including Barnes, J.)
(CPC "will rarely be issued where it is sought to review a decision of the lower federal
court refusing to interfere with the custody of petitioner held under process of the state
court." ).
48. Woods, 249 F.2d at 616 ("The action of the district court ... is peculiarly a matter
of sound discretion of the lower court."). In support of this proposition, the Ninth Circuit
cited three Supreme Court decisions-Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179 (1907); Johnson v.
U.S., 352 U.S. 565 (1957); and Farley v. U.S., 354 U.S. 521 (1957)-none of which stands
for this proposition. Two of those decisions, Johnson and Farley, were not habeas appeals
but, instead, concerned the application of the informa pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
in criminal direct appeals. Johnson, 352 U.S. at 566; Farley, 354 U.S. at 521. The Court in
Johnson stated that a trial court's refusal to permit a defendant to proceed in forma
pauperis on direct appeal "carries great weight," yet the Court held that the trial court's
ruling "cannot be conclusive." 352 U.S. at 566. In Urquhart, which was a federal habeas
case, the Court addressed the issue of when a federal court should intervene in a state
criminal case prior to the petitioner's exhaustion of state court remedies. 205 U.S. at 182.
The Court held that only in "exceptional cases" should a federal court intervene prior to
the exhaustion of state court remedies. Id. The Court did not hold, as a general matter, that
federal habeas relief should be granted only in "exceptional cases" or that any deference
was due a district court's ruling on legal issues.
49. Woods, 249 F.2d at 614.
50. Slack, 529 U.S. at 478 (emphasis added).
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has satisfied that standard need not show anything
"extraordinary" or "exceptional" about his case.5' Unlike the
Court's discretionary docket, where a litigant's showing that his
claim is meritorious will by itself be insufficient to result in an
exercise of the Court's discretionary jurisdiction, a Circuit
Justice (or the Court itself) should grant a COA if it determines
that a habeas petitioner has satisfied the minimal Barefoot
standard.
The Justices' apparent refusal to engage in "an independent
determination of the merits"52 of COA applications shirks the
"unflagging obligation"53 to exercise jurisdiction that Congress
has vested in individual Circuit Justices, if not in the full Court.
Unless Congress amends section 2253 to relieve Circuit Justices
of their jurisdiction over COA applications-as was the case
from 1925 to 1948-the Justices have a duty to exercise that
obligatory jurisdiction.
51. Cf e.g. Felker, 518 U.S. at 665 (indicating that in order for Court to grant original
writ of habeas corpus, an extraordinary writ, petitioner must demonstrate "exceptional
circumstances" ).
52. Hung, 439 U.S. at 1328 (Brennan, J., in chambers).
53. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716.

